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ISSUE NUMBER SEVEN: PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURES / INFRASTRUCTURAL
PUBLICS
Infrastructural Incursions
What does it take to flood a highway? Penny Harvey and
Hannah Knox examine how old infrastructure projects—and
old infrastructural publics—get submerged by new ones in
Peru.
In 2009 a US$2 billion project to pave a highway
through the southern Peruvian Andes was nearing
completion. For the preceding four years, heavy machinery had
trundled its way up precipitous mountainsides, carving out and
building up a roadway through rocky crevasses and waterlogged
jungle terrain. Engineers had surveyed and measured, churned and
dug, mixed and spread, excavated and eventually laid an asphalt
strip that was now wending its way from the highlands of the Cusco
region of Peru to the border with Brazil in the Peruvian Amazon.
This 700-km (435-mile) route was known as the Interoceanic
Highway.
At that time, we were engaged in an ethnographic study of this
space (Harvey and Knox 2015), and traveled this road often.
Somewhat to our surprise, we found that many people shared our
fascination with roads. Regardless of whether
we were talking with residents, academics or
taxi drivers, engineers or manual workers,
shopkeepers or frontier extractivists, everybody
had an opinion. Roads mattered to people and
seemed to hold a particular fascination as
indices of state care: a testimony to considered
investment, reckless expenditure, and/or
thoughtless abandonment. In the course of
these casual conversations rumors emerged suggesting there were
new plans to undo the road before it was even finished. Online and
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Figure 1. The Inambari Bridge, where the Interoceanic Highway crosses the River
Inambari. Source: authors.
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in roadside cafes, people began to talk about an even bigger, US$4
billion project to dam and flood the river valley at Inambari to create
a huge hydroelectric power plant. The planned hydroelectric project
was expected to flood 46,000 hectares (nearly 114,000 acres) of
forest and would notably also flood some 120 km (nearly 75 miles)
of the newly built highway. It would literally wash away millions of
dollars of investment, not to mention years of struggle by local
populations living along the route of the road to open up the
highway from the jungle to the highlands.
Infrastructures usually do not
appear de novo, but rather build
on the legacy of previous
infrastructural forms. The
Interoceanic Highway, for
example, was built in the
footprint of a previous road:
construction on Route 26 (as it
was called) had begun in the
1930s. Gradually, the state took
on the mule paths and river
fords long used by explorers
and traders in the region as a
public works project. State investment was sporadic, however, and
by the time the road reached Puerto Maldonado, the surface in
other sections was in an appalling state of disrepair. Travel was
slow and dangerous. The Interoceanic Highway project brought a
new injection of capital, this time through the collaboration of the
Peruvian state, international lenders, and a construction consortium
led by the Brazilian transnational company Odebrecht. No longer a
project of national territorial integration, the new highway promised
international connectivity not just for terrestrial movements, but via
all the other infrastructures that the new road brought with it, most
notably mobile phone towers, internet cables, and electricity.
However, the plan to build the dam suggested innovation of a
diﬀerent order. How could something as huge and solid as a 700-
km road be simply swept away in the imagination of another, bigger,
better infrastructure project? The suggested decimation of the new
road ran counter to our understanding of the palimpsest of
infrastructural formations, the material accretions that leave visible
traces of earlier forms. If floodwaters submerged the road, what
traces would remain once the dams were built? And what might
these traces tell us about the contemporary politics of
infrastructure?
First, let us consider why flooding a road with a dam would be a
problem. What would be undone, curtailed, or denied by the
proposal to flood the road? Infrastructure projects like the
Interoceanic Highway occur in part because the investment is
legitimated in the name of the public good. Historically, road
construction projects in Peru came under the remit of the Ministry
of Public Works (Ministerio de Fomento). The concept of fomento
(encouragement or impulse) was a precursor of the now more
pervasive “development” terminology. State investment in road
construction was uneven and discontinuous, but in periods of major
construction investment (in the 1920s and 1930s and again in the
1980s) roads were explicitly connected to the formation of “national
space,” “public good,” and “economic progress.”
In the 1920s and 1930s manual labor was conscripted, and
although the historical records show disquiet over how powerful
landowners abused the law, the public generally welcomed the
building of the roads themselves, not least for the ways in which
both the labor and the physical structures created an otherwise
fragile sense of citizenship. Even now, the public benefit of road
construction is written into law: the Interoceanic Highway project
was legally constituted as a public good in Ley 28214. Other legal
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statutes outlined the right of the state to purchase land alongside
the highway for its widening or extension and access to the subsoil
for purposes of excavation in road construction, all with the
expressed aim of ensuring cohesion through terrestrial connection.
So, roads in Peru continue to have an almost undisputed status as
a public good. However, neither the “public” nor the “good” are
stable states, and the dam project brings some of these instabilities
into view. Local communities living alongside Route 26 often had a
clear idea of the good that the Interoceanic Highway could bring
them. They talked about a new proximity to health care, about new
trading opportunities, and about the increasing ease and safety of
travel. But the local desire for improved connectivity, though
important to some, was far from suﬃcient to make a case for the
US$800 million investment, let alone the US$2 billion actually spent
on a road construction project. In retrospect, perhaps there was
something else at play that enabled a project of this size to purport
to be a “public good.”
That something, in this case, was a much broader sense of what
the road would enable. Conceived not just as a public work but as
an infrastructure, the road in this case was not only supposed to
benefit Peruvian populations, but was also expected to generate all
kinds of other circulatory flows. The very name interoceánica points
to the relative unimportance of the 700-km stretch of road in its own
right. The project was not just a project to build a bit of road
between the highlands of Peru and the border with Brazil, but also
an attempt to place the last piece of a jigsaw creating a terrestrial
connection between the oceans on either side of South America (an
interoceanic connection) and, perhaps even more important, to
foster a trade connection between Brazil and China through the
ports of Peru. The Interoceanic Highway as infrastructure would
thus enable the simultaneous flows of goods, capital, and people at
multiple scales.
But this shift from public work to infrastructure does not explain
why a new dam could plausibly wash away a road project of this
scale. The dam might retain some of the benefits of the road as a
public work, though not perhaps for those who needed to move
between towns on either side of the flooded section of the highway,
but surely it would undermine the flow of goods and people from
Brazil upon which the whole cost-benefit analysis of the project had
originally hinged. The contradictions in turn make it abundantly
clear that there never was a single or coherent public that stood to
Figure 3: Public Appeals
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benefit from the road construction project, or who might in turn be
served by the dam. In the planning stages of infrastructural
projects, beneficiaries are identified and enumerated as justification
for investment. The projected benefit to each and any social group
is calculated and oﬀset against the projected costs. Multiple publics
can be specified in such enumerations. An additive logic is
deployed whereby residents, haulers, entrepreneurs, town councils,
voters, farmers, students, ill people, tourists, and others become
commensurable, and thereby also abstracted from the
particularities of their interests and sensibilities. However, in
practice, interested publics arise through specific relational
possibilities that emerge through the dynamics of infrastructural
connection. In this way infrastructures, as relational formations,
gather diverse collectivities around specific projects of material
transformation.
This existence of the project oﬀers a third way of approaching the
road alongside its status as public work and as infrastructure. By
the time the dam proposals appeared in the media, the road was
well established as a “project.” Funded by IIRSA (Initiative for the
Integration of Regional Infrastructure of South America), and
brought together through a collaboration between Peruvian and
Brazilian engineering companies under the umbrella of the Conrisa
consortium, the Interoceanic Highway was a project oriented—as
the language of “project” implies—toward an as-yet unrealized
future. Creating the Interoceanic Highway project had involved
much more than building a road. The Interoceanic Highway as
“project” was a temporary coming together of people, institutions,
money, and materials held together in an alliance that would by
definition dissolve upon completion. It was not the public work, nor
the infrastructure, but the project that had gained funding from the
CAF (Central Andean Fund). Odebrecht ran the project, which was
backed by the Peruvian government, structured around feasibility
plans, argued for in Parliament, and supported by environmental
agencies that mitigated the risks of international investors.
The dam, likewise, was a similarly created project. Like the
Interoceanic Highway, it too was a consortium involving a Brazilian
construction company, this time OAS. Like the Interoceanic
Highway project, it gained backing and investment from the
Brazilian state and was the outcome of negotiations between the
Peruvian and Brazilian governments. Understanding the dam as a
project does not undermine the achievements of the Interoceanic
“project.” For within the logic of the “project,” or now in this case
the “megaproject,” the cost and logistics of rerouting the 120 km of
road was simply something to reabsorb into the new plans. The
focus on the project makes visible the traces of the road in the
emerging contours of the dam. The project as palimpsest makes
visible the continuities in what otherwise appeared as a radical
change. And although not immediately visible, the traces of the
Interoceanic Highway would remain in the financial, bureaucratic,
and political relations between state and engineering company. The
relevant public, on the other hand, is reconfigured as overtly
transnational. The relevant public of public works is at some level
always a citizen. Public works are conceived and managed through
state agencies. Infrastructures break this mold and blur the
boundaries between public and private institutions and interests.
The project can move between these possibilities and can also
become an entirely private aﬀair in which the consumer and the
market rather than the citizen are the primary beneficiaries.
Previously configured publics do not, however, disappear without a
struggle. For two years various parties protested and opposed the
dam. In the end, just before the Peruvian elections in June 2011,
then-President Alan García announced that the project had been
abandoned, citing protests by indigenous groups who argued that
their land would be flooded. Ecological protection and indigenous
rights cohered momentarily as a new conjoined space of public
interest in need of protection. However, it is significant that the dam
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project was never definitively cancelled and remains “viable” as an
object of public investment. Meanwhile, Odebrecht, OAS, and the
Brazilian and Peruvian states face ever-deepening charges of
corruption. The political agreements that allowed the imagination of
a seamless move from road to dam are, for the moment,
destabilized in the face of global uncertainties concerning how
exactly “public” benefit accrues from private investment.
Penny Harvey is Professor of Anthropology at the University of
Manchester. She is currently co-writing a book with Deborah Poole
entitled Experimental States: Creativity, Uncertainty and Forms of
the Political in Neoliberal Peru – and a new collection on
Infrastructure and Social Complexity, co-edited with Casper Bruun
Jensen and Atsuro Morita is published by Routledge in the fall of
2016.
Hannah Knox is Lecturer in Anthropology at University College
London. She has published widely on technology, politics and
expertise and has done fieldwork in Peru and Europe. She is
currently writing a book about the cultural politics of carbon
reduction and climate change, and is co-editor of a new collection on
Big Data and Ethnography.
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